the economist
Nov 17th 2010, 14:31 by T.J.
IF YOU think of think tanks as firing off reports rather than shells, then the Balkans are under siege at the moment. Unlike rounds from actual tanks, however (or progress reports from the European Commission), it is difficult to measure the impact of the incoming reports.
Here are some highlights from four new think-tank publications on the Balkans, three of which focus on Kosovo, the current hot topic.
"A bridge over troubled borders: Europeanising the Balkans", a new policy brief from the European Policy Centre in Brussels, suggests that the winds in the Balkans might be starting to blow in a more promising direction. Serbia-Kosovo talks are about to be launched, after prodding from the European Union. Still, much work needs to be done. The authors, Rosa Balfour and Dijana Basic, cite a number of potential roadblocks, including the Macedonian name dispute with Greece, Serbo-Croatian border rows in areas where the meandering Danube has changed course over time, and a seriously obscure spat over Sastavci, a Bosnian (and Republika Srpska) village wholly surrounded by Serbian territory.
What should be done to help resolve these conflicts, real and potential? Drawing on examples from the 1990s, the paper says:
“The EU could promote a region-wide process modelled on the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe... [I]t is to the EU that the international community in general looks to promote future stability and prosperity for the region: being surrounded by EU member states, the Balkans are effectively in the EU’s own locality... If they are to be stable, maps cannot be drawn at the table. Minority rights need to be included and addressed through creative and democratic institutional and administrative solutions, especially in frontier and multi-ethnic areas. One way of approaching this potentially explosive issue is to involve civil society and local institutions. Grassroots and local initiatives need far more support and visibility in the EU and in the Balkans. Cross-border cooperation, initiatives aiming at reconciling citizens across different countries, property restitution projects, developing social networks, are all much-needed bottom-up approaches to support people in climbing out of the dark hole of ethno-nationalism.”
Well that is all very nice. In fact, there are plenty of serious initiatives around aimed at reconciliation, the most prominent among them being RECOM (which you can read about here; click the "ENG" tab for an English-language version). Such efforts can have an effect: witness this month’s visit by Serbian president Boris Tadic to the Croatian town of Vukovar, which was pulverised by Serbian forces in 1991. But with the single currency collapsing around their ears, Eurocrats may struggle to find time and energy to solving the outstanding issues of the Balkans.
On the other side of the pond, the United States Institute of Peace is weighing in with a more targeted brief, by Dan Serwer, called "Kosovo: The Next Steps". Mr Serwer, an old Balkan hand, says that Kosovo must not be left to become a "frozen conflict", that talks between Belgrade and Pristina are both necessary and possible, and that a joint EU/US effort is the best prospect for the success of talks:
“Secretary [Hillary] Clinton’s trip to the Balkans in October demonstrated her commitment to continuing American engagement there... The EU’s successful formation of a united front against the proposed Serbian General Assembly resolution forced Belgrade’s acceptance of an unobjectionable text that has the virtue of launching talks on practical issues that can begin to construct the framework for a managed relationship that both Belgrade and Pristina need... the US and the EU need to continue to work jointly to provide a safe space for productive talks. The level of coordination required goes significantly beyond normal diplomatic practice and should include one or more Americans on the EU team that convenes the Pristina/Belgrade talks.”
In other words: Hey, Europeans, don’t even think of trying to do something without us.
Back in Europe, "Kosovo: Four Futures", an article in Survival, the journal of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, sketches out some alternative possibilities for Kosovo:
“The four most likely scenarios for the future of Kosovo are continuation of the status quo (Kosovo effectively remains divided, subject to contested legitimacy and internationally maintained); full independence within current boundaries; a formal agreement to adjust the boundaries (the northern tip remains part of Serbia in return for Belgrade dropping opposition to independence for the remaining areas); and extended and reinforced autonomy for Kosovo’s northern territory. All have both merits and drawbacks. Negotiated and extensive autonomy for northern Kosovo seems to be the preferred option internationally and is the likeliest outcome. Yet the more radical option of a negotiated partition offers the best hope for drawing a line under the contested issue of Kosovo’s statehood. Such a solution would allow Kosovo and Serbia to forge a more normal relationship as they each pursue EU membership.”
The article is an excellent summary of where we are now. But by plumping for the partition of Kosovo, with the Serbian-inhabited north going to Serbia, the three authors have nailed their colours to an unpopular mast. The International Crisis Group was widely excoriated when it discussed partition in a recent report. The reason most analysts are wary is the fear that once you tinker with what were once internal Yugoslav borders you open a Pandora's box, potentially causing explosive and bloody problems for Bosnia and Macedonia. This is an argument not to be lightly dismissed.
Finally, a paper [in Serbian] from the New Policy Centre in Belgrade. The paper is a proposal for a Serbian negotiating position on Kosovo. Serbs, the authors say, must understand that they will never rule their former province again, for three reasons. First, a major armed conflict would be needed to get it back, and Serbia has no capacity for that. Second, the construction of a common political union is unrealistic. Third, Serbia cannot afford to pay for reunification. This is all blindingly obvious to most outsiders who know the region, but for Serbs this sort of basic stuff will have a lot more credibility coming from a domestic think tank than from a foreign one.
Sadly, the authors go on to explore some truly wacky terrain. As Kosovo is a part of Serbia, according to the latter's constitution, the New Policy Centre proposes that Serbia indulge in a blatant legal fiction. It suggests following the model of the Statute of Westminster, “which the British Crown signed with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa in 1931. With this agreement these countries were given legislative independence, but in principle remained under British sovereignty. Although there are certain elements which cannot serve as analogous (colonial aspect, sovereignty of the crown), the whole political process has the same context and purpose.”
Of course, there is no reason for the Kosovars to agree to this, since for them independence in 2008 ended the lingering sovereign link with Serbia. However, as part of an informal "live and let live" deal, they could allow the Serbs to pass some sort of meaningless law pretending they still had sovereignty over Kosovo, in exchange for the pretence that the government in Pristina exercises any form of control over the Serb-majority north of Kosovo, which in effect is part of Serbia. Maybe someone should write a report on that?
IF YOU think of think tanks as firing off reports rather than shells, then the Balkans are under siege at the moment. Unlike rounds from actual tanks, however (or progress reports from the European Commission), it is difficult to measure the impact of the incoming reports.
Here are some highlights from four new think-tank publications on the Balkans, three of which focus on Kosovo, the current hot topic.
"A bridge over troubled borders: Europeanising the Balkans", a new policy brief from the European Policy Centre in Brussels, suggests that the winds in the Balkans might be starting to blow in a more promising direction. Serbia-Kosovo talks are about to be launched, after prodding from the European Union. Still, much work needs to be done. The authors, Rosa Balfour and Dijana Basic, cite a number of potential roadblocks, including the Macedonian name dispute with Greece, Serbo-Croatian border rows in areas where the meandering Danube has changed course over time, and a seriously obscure spat over Sastavci, a Bosnian (and Republika Srpska) village wholly surrounded by Serbian territory.
What should be done to help resolve these conflicts, real and potential? Drawing on examples from the 1990s, the paper says:
“The EU could promote a region-wide process modelled on the Stability Pact for Central and Eastern Europe... [I]t is to the EU that the international community in general looks to promote future stability and prosperity for the region: being surrounded by EU member states, the Balkans are effectively in the EU’s own locality... If they are to be stable, maps cannot be drawn at the table. Minority rights need to be included and addressed through creative and democratic institutional and administrative solutions, especially in frontier and multi-ethnic areas. One way of approaching this potentially explosive issue is to involve civil society and local institutions. Grassroots and local initiatives need far more support and visibility in the EU and in the Balkans. Cross-border cooperation, initiatives aiming at reconciling citizens across different countries, property restitution projects, developing social networks, are all much-needed bottom-up approaches to support people in climbing out of the dark hole of ethno-nationalism.”
Well that is all very nice. In fact, there are plenty of serious initiatives around aimed at reconciliation, the most prominent among them being RECOM (which you can read about here; click the "ENG" tab for an English-language version). Such efforts can have an effect: witness this month’s visit by Serbian president Boris Tadic to the Croatian town of Vukovar, which was pulverised by Serbian forces in 1991. But with the single currency collapsing around their ears, Eurocrats may struggle to find time and energy to solving the outstanding issues of the Balkans.
On the other side of the pond, the United States Institute of Peace is weighing in with a more targeted brief, by Dan Serwer, called "Kosovo: The Next Steps". Mr Serwer, an old Balkan hand, says that Kosovo must not be left to become a "frozen conflict", that talks between Belgrade and Pristina are both necessary and possible, and that a joint EU/US effort is the best prospect for the success of talks:
“Secretary [Hillary] Clinton’s trip to the Balkans in October demonstrated her commitment to continuing American engagement there... The EU’s successful formation of a united front against the proposed Serbian General Assembly resolution forced Belgrade’s acceptance of an unobjectionable text that has the virtue of launching talks on practical issues that can begin to construct the framework for a managed relationship that both Belgrade and Pristina need... the US and the EU need to continue to work jointly to provide a safe space for productive talks. The level of coordination required goes significantly beyond normal diplomatic practice and should include one or more Americans on the EU team that convenes the Pristina/Belgrade talks.”
In other words: Hey, Europeans, don’t even think of trying to do something without us.
Back in Europe, "Kosovo: Four Futures", an article in Survival, the journal of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies, sketches out some alternative possibilities for Kosovo:
“The four most likely scenarios for the future of Kosovo are continuation of the status quo (Kosovo effectively remains divided, subject to contested legitimacy and internationally maintained); full independence within current boundaries; a formal agreement to adjust the boundaries (the northern tip remains part of Serbia in return for Belgrade dropping opposition to independence for the remaining areas); and extended and reinforced autonomy for Kosovo’s northern territory. All have both merits and drawbacks. Negotiated and extensive autonomy for northern Kosovo seems to be the preferred option internationally and is the likeliest outcome. Yet the more radical option of a negotiated partition offers the best hope for drawing a line under the contested issue of Kosovo’s statehood. Such a solution would allow Kosovo and Serbia to forge a more normal relationship as they each pursue EU membership.”
The article is an excellent summary of where we are now. But by plumping for the partition of Kosovo, with the Serbian-inhabited north going to Serbia, the three authors have nailed their colours to an unpopular mast. The International Crisis Group was widely excoriated when it discussed partition in a recent report. The reason most analysts are wary is the fear that once you tinker with what were once internal Yugoslav borders you open a Pandora's box, potentially causing explosive and bloody problems for Bosnia and Macedonia. This is an argument not to be lightly dismissed.
Finally, a paper [in Serbian] from the New Policy Centre in Belgrade. The paper is a proposal for a Serbian negotiating position on Kosovo. Serbs, the authors say, must understand that they will never rule their former province again, for three reasons. First, a major armed conflict would be needed to get it back, and Serbia has no capacity for that. Second, the construction of a common political union is unrealistic. Third, Serbia cannot afford to pay for reunification. This is all blindingly obvious to most outsiders who know the region, but for Serbs this sort of basic stuff will have a lot more credibility coming from a domestic think tank than from a foreign one.
Sadly, the authors go on to explore some truly wacky terrain. As Kosovo is a part of Serbia, according to the latter's constitution, the New Policy Centre proposes that Serbia indulge in a blatant legal fiction. It suggests following the model of the Statute of Westminster, “which the British Crown signed with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa in 1931. With this agreement these countries were given legislative independence, but in principle remained under British sovereignty. Although there are certain elements which cannot serve as analogous (colonial aspect, sovereignty of the crown), the whole political process has the same context and purpose.”
Of course, there is no reason for the Kosovars to agree to this, since for them independence in 2008 ended the lingering sovereign link with Serbia. However, as part of an informal "live and let live" deal, they could allow the Serbs to pass some sort of meaningless law pretending they still had sovereignty over Kosovo, in exchange for the pretence that the government in Pristina exercises any form of control over the Serb-majority north of Kosovo, which in effect is part of Serbia. Maybe someone should write a report on that?
the economist
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