the economist
Turkey's islamists
What a prime minister’s funeral says about democracy and Islam
Mar 3rd 2011 ISTANBUL from the print edition
HE WAS booted out by Turkey’s generals in what became known as the postmodern coup in 1997. One even called him “a pimp”. He was jailed and his party banned. Yet the top brass were among thousands of Turks at the funeral of Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, on March 1st (poignantly, a day after the coup’s 14th anniversary). The chief of the general staff hailed Mr Erbakan’s “great services to our country as a valued man of science and politics”.
Cast by his secular enemies as a dangerous religious reactionary, Mr Erbakan is now acknowledged as a moderating force on Turkey’s Islamists. As the Arab world looks to Turkey as a possible model, Mr Erbakan’s legacy has new significance. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and president, Abdullah Gul, both cut their political teeth under him. He was fiercely anti-Western, decrying the European Union as a Zionist Christian club and railing against usury and the free market. Yet unlike some Islamists (but like Turkey’s Tarikat Sufi Islamic fraternities), he disavowed all forms of violence. He sported a suit and tie (usually Versace). When the army pushed him out in 1997, Mr Erbakan did not call on his followers to take to the streets. He infused his message with generous helpings of nationalism. When asked about his humiliation by the generals recently, he responded: “They are the sons of this country too.” He quarrelled with the state, though he was firmly wedded to it.
Yet it came as no surprise when Mr Gul and Mr Erdogan broke ranks to form the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party in 2001. In a big break with their mentor they embraced both the free market and the EU. Combined with the abject failure of secular rivals, this catapulted AK to single-party rule in 2002. Hasim Hasimi, a Kurdish former member of Mr Erbakan’s party, notes that “splinter groups in Islamic movements outside Turkey went in the opposite direction: they became more radical.” That is a concern in north Africa, too.
Mar 3rd 2011 ISTANBUL from the print edition
HE WAS booted out by Turkey’s generals in what became known as the postmodern coup in 1997. One even called him “a pimp”. He was jailed and his party banned. Yet the top brass were among thousands of Turks at the funeral of Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, on March 1st (poignantly, a day after the coup’s 14th anniversary). The chief of the general staff hailed Mr Erbakan’s “great services to our country as a valued man of science and politics”.
Cast by his secular enemies as a dangerous religious reactionary, Mr Erbakan is now acknowledged as a moderating force on Turkey’s Islamists. As the Arab world looks to Turkey as a possible model, Mr Erbakan’s legacy has new significance. Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and president, Abdullah Gul, both cut their political teeth under him. He was fiercely anti-Western, decrying the European Union as a Zionist Christian club and railing against usury and the free market. Yet unlike some Islamists (but like Turkey’s Tarikat Sufi Islamic fraternities), he disavowed all forms of violence. He sported a suit and tie (usually Versace). When the army pushed him out in 1997, Mr Erbakan did not call on his followers to take to the streets. He infused his message with generous helpings of nationalism. When asked about his humiliation by the generals recently, he responded: “They are the sons of this country too.” He quarrelled with the state, though he was firmly wedded to it.
Yet it came as no surprise when Mr Gul and Mr Erdogan broke ranks to form the ruling Justice and Development (AK) party in 2001. In a big break with their mentor they embraced both the free market and the EU. Combined with the abject failure of secular rivals, this catapulted AK to single-party rule in 2002. Hasim Hasimi, a Kurdish former member of Mr Erbakan’s party, notes that “splinter groups in Islamic movements outside Turkey went in the opposite direction: they became more radical.” That is a concern in north Africa, too.
Speaking to journalists before a trip to Egypt this week, Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, drew comparisons between the Turkish and Egyptian armies. “They are truly national in character,” he said. “The Egyptian army must be left intact in order that there be a peaceful transition to democracy.” AK’s critics might say the same should hold for Turkey, where a record tenth of all serving generals are in jail on charges of plotting to overthrow the government in the so-called Ergenekon case. No doubt coup-mongers are among them, yet there is widespread concern that some caught up in the trials are innocent people whose crime is to oppose AK. The main Turkish opposition leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, has called for the trials to be broadcast to help establish the truth.
Even as Turkey parades its model before the Arab world, Mr Erdogan should not forget that part of its attraction is its embrace of the EU. Yet this week he engaged in a new round of Europe-bashing (especially in Germany, where he accused his hosts of forcibly assimilating the Turkish minority), reinforcing speculation that AK is no longer really interested in joining the EU. Indeed with his talk of the EU being “a Christian club”, Mr Erdogan sounds worryingly like Mr Erbakan 14 years ago. With an election approaching, Mr Erdogan may merely be trying to keep the nationalist opposition out of parliament by wooing its voters. At all events, Turkey’s experience suggests that Islam and democracy remain a sustainable, if sometimes (as with Mr Erbakan) awkward, mix.
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